Da’wah bil Qalam by Al Isra, Andi Batara
Jurnal Emik, Volume 2 Nomor 2, Desember 2019 
149 
Da’wah bil Qalam:  
From Political Islam to the “Islamic Way” of Resistance  
through Writings in Indonesia 
 
Andi Batara Al Isra M. 
Master Student in Anthropology, University of Auckland 
aali598@aucklanduni.ac.nz 
 
 
Abstrak 
Di tengah pergolakan politik yang terjadi di Indonesia antara oposisi dan pemerintah 
yang berkuasa (di bawah Presiden Joko Widodo), beberapa organisasi Islam membentuk 
gerakan protes dalam aksi damai (yang mahsyur dikenal debagai Aksi Bela Islam) serta 
melalui tulisan yang dapat dikategorikan sebagai bentuk gerakan Islam dengan metode 
da’wah bil qalam (dakwah melalui tulisan). Artikel ini mengeksplorasi ide bagaimana 
menulis disebut sebagai ‘perlawanan Islami’ bagi Muslim di Indonesia dan hubungannya 
dengan konsep fillah, jihad dan amar ma'ruf nahi munkar. 
Dengan menggunakan penelitian kepustakaan, artikel ini mengungkap hubungan antara 
penulisan (da’wah bil qalam) dengan Islam politik dan “perlawanan Islami” sebagai 
semangat kebangkitan Islam dalam dua periode penting di Indonesia, yaitu Orde Baru 
dan reformasi (pasca-Soeharto atau era kontemporer). Masing-masing periode 
membentuk cara da’wah bil qalam yang berbeda. Di Orde Baru, karena penindasan oleh 
pemerintah, beberapa aktivis Islam mulai menggunakan tulisan sebagai media untuk 
melakukan dakwah ketimbang berkhotbah melalui mimbar-mimbar. Para penulis 
Muslim harus “membungkus” kritik terhadap pemerintah dengan “cara yang indah”. 
Setelah reformasi, da’wah bil qalam menjadi lebih terbuka. Da’wah jenis ini pun telah 
berkembang melalui internet, khususnya di media sosial. Namun demikian, intinya masih 
sama: da’wah bil qalam dapat dianggap sebagai bentuk perlawanan terhadap 
kehadiran negara yang dianggap tidak memihak pada golongan tertentu umat Islam. 
Kata Kunci: Da’wah bil Qalam, Islam Politik, Resistensi, Perlawanan Islami, Kebangkitan 
Islam. 
 
Introduction 
It is interesting to know how these periods have 
shaped the different way of Muslim resistance 
towards the governments in terms of political 
Islam that is related to Islamic revivalism. 
Scholars sometimes use this term with Islamism 
or fundamentalism interchangeably (Dekmejian 
1980:2).  
The point that I would like to explain in 
this article is how the Islamic movement 
through writing can be considered as a form of 
resistance to the presence of a state that is 
deemed to be impartial. Delibas (2009:89) 
considers that Islamic movements were born in 
response to the diversity of social, economic 
and political conditions that are driven by rapid 
urbanisation and the forces of economic 
globalisation that occur in Muslim countries, 
both Arab and Non-Arab countries. The Islamic 
movement is a new discourse in studies relating 
to the social movement. This term appeared in 
the decade of the 90s (Delibas 2009:360). 
Delibas’ research emerges the notion that 
Islamic movements in Turkey rose (for instance, 
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the Welfare Party which is considered 
moderate because the basis is grassroots 
groups, not extreme Islamic ideology) as the 
impact of the negative effects of globalisation 
and the application of neoliberal economic 
policies. 
In her study of the rise of Islamic 
movement through social media in Indonesia, 
Nisa (2018) prefers to use the term Islamic 
social movement rather than being trapped in 
the dichotomy between the Islamic movement 
and social movement discussed by Delibas since 
this concept seems to provide a clear 
explanation that the study of Islamic 
movements is also part of the study of social 
movements (that is more focused on Islamic 
movements). In addition, the work of Watson 
(2018) is also prominent as a reference to see 
the context of the Islamic movement in 
Indonesia. His article helps to understand the 
context of a more contemporary Islamic 
movement in Indonesia. 
In relation to the discussion of resistance, 
one that I found relevant to the case of the 
da’wah bil qalam in Indonesia is the work of 
Scott (1985). In his ethnographic study of the 
resistance of peasantry against landlords in 
Malaysia, Scott revealed that resistance could 
be in any form, not merely through a revolution 
with violence, such as pretending to be sick, 
swearing, gossip, and other forms of petty 
resistance. We can see the similarity of 
resistance in the context of da’wah bil qalam 
conducted by the opposition of Islamic 
organizations in Indonesia. They feel they have 
been treated unfairly by the state, so that the 
resistance is needed to be raised, but in an 
“Islamic way”. 
Indonesia has the largest Muslim 
population1, so that it is an obvious if all of the 
                                                          
1
See https://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-
of-the-global-muslim-population/, accessed on 9
th
 of 
November 2019. 
 
aspects intertwined with Islami, including 
politics. Indeed, da’wah, according to Hirchkind 
(2009:117), necessarily extends to political 
topics. It is an activity of revealing and realizing 
Islamic ideals of moral life through persuasion, 
exhortation, and deliberation, making da’wah 
as a political practice (2009:117). However, 
before we go further to the concept of da’wah 
bil qalam, it is crucial to understand what 
actually da’wah means since the concept is the 
central to the topic and is critical for social 
sciences (Gerring 1999:358). 
 Many scholars argue that the concept of 
da’wah has plethora of definitions and 
meanings. It could be considered as 
supplication, convocation, invocation, calling, 
appeal, summoning, invitation, request, or even 
missionary activity (Walker, 1995). However, 
the term ‘proselytisation’ is commonly found in 
anthropological sources as well as in other 
social science articles to define briefly (and 
precisely) the concept of da’wah (or da’wa) 
(see Abdullah, 2010; Arnez, 2009; Hirchkind, 
2009; Arnez and Nisa, 2016). In general, da’wah 
can be defined as a system or a way of inviting 
to and educating people about Islamic moral 
values’ (Kamaldeen and Olatubosun, 2013:2). 
All activities of sharing Islamic values or 
kindness in any various form is considered as 
da’wah.  
Da’wah has become one of the most 
important topics in contemporary Islamic 
thought since it is related to the social and 
political functions (Hirchkind 2009:108). 
Hirchkind, for instance, relates this concept 
with Islamic counterpublic (a way to counter 
mainstream public narration) in Egypt where he 
found out that da’wah has become the main 
reason to encourage fellow Muslims in the 
pursuance of the greater piety in all aspects of 
live (Hirchkind 2009:109). In relation to this, 
one of the characteristics that are inseparable 
with da’wah is fillah (“for the sake of God”). 
Consequently, Muslim involved in da’wah 
activities should devote themselves only for the 
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goodness and for the spread of Islamic ideas. 
Racius (2004) in his study about Islamic da’wah 
reveal that some Muslims perceives da’wah as 
an individual compulsory for Muslim, while 
others, like a classic famous Islamic scholar, 
Imam Ghazali, believe it as a collective duty 
through which oneself does da’wah, other 
Muslims do not have to do it. Furthermore, 
according to some Islamic scholars, da’wah can 
be categorised into three main forms: da’wah 
bil khitabah (sermon, or da’wah in a forum, 
mosque, seminar, etc), da’wah bil hal (da’wah 
in ‘everyday life’ by showing kindness, for 
instance) and da’wah bil qalam (da’wah by the 
“pen”)(Kango 2014:106).  
This article focus on da’wah bil qalam 
because it is the most interesting one. Da’wah 
bil qalam (literally means da’wah by the pen), in 
general, is a form of spreading the kindness in 
the context of Islamic values through writings 
for the sake of da’wah (Arnez, 2009:5). At this 
point, da’wah bil qalam is a way to bring or 
introduce Islam to the wider community, while 
the other two forms of da’wah might absence 
since both of them are only for particular 
audience. Kango (2014:106) also stated that for 
Muslims, da’wah bil qalam might be more 
effective since people nowadays are busy and 
they do not have much time to go to the 
mosque or Islamic seminar to listen sermons. In 
brief, da’wah bil qalam means that the da’iya 
(people who spread the da’wah), brings the 
da’wah to others.  
Before we go through to the next section 
of this article, it is also important to know in 
brief the normative base of da’wah bil qalam. 
Although Bowen (2014:9) states that as a world 
religion, Islam is not only studied in terms of 
sacred-Arabic texts, it is also that looking at the 
Qur’an as the prime source of law is important 
for Muslims. Bowen (2014:5) indicates that he 
learns the normative sources in his fieldwork in 
Aceh because people are taking references 
from the particular source of values (colonial 
law, contemporary civil law, and Islamic codes) 
(Bowen 2003:5). The normative base of this 
da’wah bil qalam can be found in the Qurʾān 
(Q.S. 96:1-5), the first verses received by the 
Prophet Muhammad which is a command to 
read. Arnez (2009:5) argues that these verses 
are considered clear proof for Muslims to write 
for the sake of da’wah (fillah) and “to let others 
to read or to know more about Islam”, and at 
the same time, it is also related to the 
obligation of being educated.2 Thus, da’wah 
becomes a way of educating people and 
according to Hirchkind, it is a prior cultivation of 
virtues (Hirchkind 2009:130). It is more than an 
individual salvation. Da’wah is a form of Islamic 
movement that could construct ethical 
sociability by speaking in front of moral error 
for the sake of ummah. It is a medium of social 
and political reform, and in Indonesia context, 
the term is very close to political party 
(Hirchkind 2009:131).  
The reason why da’wah bil qalam 
become a part of Islamic movement in 
Indonesia is because Islamic writers who take 
the role as the oppositions to the incumbent 
president use writing as “weapons” to deliver 
critics and protests in various ways, embodied 
in a form of articles, articles, creative writings, 
or statuses in social media (Arnez 2009; Arnez 
and Nisa 2016). Therefore, the intention of 
da’wah bil qalam, according to Kailani (2012:33) 
is to enlighten and illuminate people through 
writings. The terms refer to the spreading of 
Islamic values, so that people will understand 
where Islam matters in a particular condition 
(i.e. politics). Also, it could be categorised as a 
part of Islamic revivalism, a transnational 
movement to return Islam into its roots 
(Dekmejian 1980:2). Arnez (2009:50) claimed 
that da’wah bil qalam in Indonesia is a 
compulsory for all Muslims who get involved in 
Islamic organisations (particularly in literacy 
                                                          
2
 Q.S. 96 (Al-Alaq:1-5): “Read in the name of your Lord 
who created. He created the human being from alaq (an 
embryo). Read, and your Lord is the owner of the Greatest 
Honour. That He taught with pen. He has taught the 
human being what he did not know”. 
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movement) as a preparation to face 
“globalisation era”. This is related in Hirchkind 
explanation (2009) about al-ghazwa al-fikri 
(ideological conquest or cultural imperialism), a 
term of the ideological operation of mass 
media, films, secular education, and the 
increasing hegemony of Western cultural forms. 
Thus, da’wah bil qalam is one of the ways of 
preaching to combat the false or distorted 
understandings of Islamic principles, including 
in politics (2009:168).  
Furthermore, da’wah bil qalam, 
according to Arnez will always be related to 
morality, spirituality and social responsibility 
since the intention of the writers suggest that 
their readers could follow Islamic rules and be 
committed in their fight against injustice and 
oppression (Arnez 2009:62). Similar project can 
be found in Cody’s study on the enlightenment 
project for rural activists in Karampatti towards 
literacy and fight against injustice (Cody 2013).  
The article aims to explore the idea of 
da’wah bil qalam as an “Islamic way” of 
resistance for Muslims in Indonesia in different 
orders, from the New Order and beyond and its 
relation to the related concepts in Islam, such 
as fillah (for the sake of God), jihad (holy war), 
and amar ma’ruf nahi munkar (enjoining goods 
and prohibiting evil). 
 
Research Methods 
This article is based on library research on 
Muslims’ way of resistance in Indonesia and 
how this is related to the concept of fillah, jihad 
and amar ma’ruf nahi munkar. Furthermore, 
some data that I put in this article came from 
my own experience as a member of Forum 
Lingkar Pena (Pen Circle Forum, FLP) since 2012 
as well as my experience as a member who is 
interacted with others in the organisation who 
get involved in da’wah movement, and a 
research assistant in a research conducted by 
Australia-Indonesia Centre (AIC) on, among 
others, democracy in contemporary Indonesia.  
 
Da’wah bil Qalam: Before and Early After the 
Fall of Suharto  
In this section, I will elaborate more about how 
da’wah bil qalam rose in the era of Suharto or 
New Order (and early after he stepped down in 
1998). Writing as a weapon to spread the critics 
to the government is not something new in 
reformation era (era reformasi). Rijal (2005) 
argues that the tendency to spread Islamic 
ideas through writing can be traced back at 
least, to the first Islamic magazine in 1985, 
Sabili (my way) which was followed by more 
Islamic magazines, such as Ummi (my mother, 
1989) and Annida (calling, 1991). All of the 
magazines mentioned emerged as a response 
to the Suharto regime that suppressed political 
Islam by applying policies contradicted with 
Islamic values, for instance, all political parties 
were expected to adopt Pancasila (the five 
principles)3 as the single principle (asas 
tunggal). Some Islamic activists argue that this 
policy could mean that Pancasila would replace 
Islam or that Pancasila will be equal to (or even 
become) religion (Rijal 2005:431). For some 
Muslims, Islam should be the ultimate truth, 
based on the understanding that Allah’s law 
should be above everything. Allah will be 
jealous if Muslims equal his law with the “man-
made” one. We can see this “jealousy” in 
Mernissi’s account, though in different context 
(Mernissi 2011:62). In brief, forcing Pancasila as 
the sole foundation means degrading the 
position of Islam. Thus, Munir (2004:4) states 
that the issue is not how to enforce Islamic 
states, but how Islamic guiding principles can be 
materialised in the government system. 
Moreover, at that time, many preachers 
were controlled and prohibited to conduct 
da’wah in mosque or in seminars, some of 
                                                          
33
 Pancasila is the official, foundational philosophical 
theory of Indonesia. Pancasila comprises (1) Believe in the 
one supreme God; 2) Justice and civilised humanity; 3) the 
unity of Indonesia; 4) the democracy led by understanding 
wisdom among honorable representatives from the 
parliament house; 5) social justice for all of the people of 
Indonesia. 
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them even put in jail on charge spreading of 
hate speeches to the government (Rijal 
2005:431). Because of this condition, some 
Islamic activists start to criticize in a “beautiful 
way” through da’wah bil qalam (Rijal 2005, 
Widodo 2008, Arnez 2009, Kailani 2012, Kango 
2014, Isra 2016, and Arnez and Nisa 2016). This 
“beautiful way” of critic through creative 
writing could penetrate Islamic values, such as 
using very polite words, avoiding open critic to 
the government, and preferring to use 
metaphorical words in the study involving 
Forum Lingkar Pena, a massive Islamic writers 
organisation established in 1997 (a year before 
reformasi), this beautiful way of writing is also 
considered as the Islamic way of writing. This 
Islamic way of writing spreads the “literacy 
virus” as an obligation for Muslims to enlighten 
people (Widodo 2008, Arnez 2009, Kailani 2012, 
Isra 2016; Arnez and Nisa 2016). 
After the fall of Suharto in 1998, 
Pancasila lost its hegemonic authority and was 
challenged by massive waves of “Islamisation”, 
especially in the form of identity politics related 
to religions (Nordholt 2008:2). Islamic 
magazines and Islamic writings also have been 
more “brave” to spread Islamic ideas, such as 
criticising governments or vividly bringing Islam 
to public audience (Rijal 2005:430-435) and at 
the same time do not lost their characteristics 
as Islamic way of writings. In spite of the three 
Islamic magazines (Sabili, Ummi, Annida) more 
and more Islamic writings were published, such 
as Tarbawi and Saksi (Rijal 2005:430). Both of 
these are affiliated to an Islamic political party, 
namely Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous 
and Justice Party, PKS) and along with Sabili, all 
of these Islamic magazines consistently criticise 
the government policies that is considered as a 
proof of “de-islamisation”. The proliferation of 
Islamic magazines and writings is caused by the 
new era of democracy when the climate of 
suppressive policies towards Islam (like what 
Suharto did) is less (Rijal 2005:430-435).  
Some scholars understand this 
phenomenon as a process of radicalisation and 
tolerance declination marked by massive 
number of Islamic reformist movements. These 
are called gerakan tarbiyah or jamaah tarbiyah 
(tarbiyah movement) (Rijal 2005, Arnez 2009, 
and Nisa 2018). Reformation era brought 
freedom for more transnational Islamic 
revivalism (reformist) and Islamic radicalism to 
grow, and at the same time, Islamic 
organisations adopted that kind of Islamic 
understandings, established in the name of 
freedom of speech and religious expression, 
making Indonesia less tolerance (Nordholt 
2008, Robinson 2014, and Harsono 2009),  
Interestingly, those transnational Islamic 
organisations have gained support and 
attention from Indonesian Muslim even though 
Robinson (2014:26) describes it as “the 
creeping influence of intolerant Wahabi models 
of religious purity”. In relation to this, it is 
argued that Islamic radicalism in Indonesia has 
come to its prominence with the significant 
contribution of financial support from 
international organisations from Middle East 
countries, such as Saudi Arabian authorities 
(Hefner 1997, van Bruinessen 2002, Rijal 2005, 
and Nordholt 2008). PKS is a salient example 
since not only this Islamic political party 
affiliated with Jamaah Tarbiyah or Ikhwanul 
Muslimin (Islamic Brotherhood) in Egypt, but 
they have also received funding from those 
countries and not funded by any major western 
donors (Nordholt 2008:15).  
 
Da’wah bil Qalam as a “Jihad”: From Ahok 
Saga to #2019GantiPresiden 
In this section, I will discuss more about da’wah 
bil qalam in the contemporary era, especially 
after Jokowi has been elected as the president. 
In the context of Islam and for the obligation of 
da’wah, it is important to notice that all 
writings produced either by the “Islamic 
reformists”, such as those affiliated with PKS 
and Islamic traditionalists, such as those who 
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are members of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) are still 
considered as da’wah bil qalam. It does not 
matter where do people come from or what are 
their Islamic backgrounds, it is the motive or 
intention (niat) that defines a particular writing 
can be categorised as da’wah material or not. In 
referring to Rijal’s (2005) account on the 
intention of da’wah, I see da’wah bil qalam is in 
accordance with amar ma’ruf nahi munkar 
(enjoining goods and prohibiting evil). It is a 
way to spread the goodness and at the same 
time, it is a “weapon” to fight against evil. 
Kango (2014:106) argues that da’wah bil qalam 
could possibly become the power to perform 
jihad (holy war) towards all the “enemies” of 
Islam. Even though the concept of jihad in the 
context of da’wah bil qalam and war (in its 
literal meaning) is significantly different, 
nonetheless, the core meaning is similar: a form 
of amar ma’ruf nahi munkar for the sake of God 
(fillah).  
All of the Islamic magazines and writings 
mentioned above are taking part in the process 
of jihad. For the Islamic writers, media such as 
magazines, newspapers, social media, is the 
arena of jihad and pen is the symbol of 
“weapon” that can facilitate them to write. 
Kailani (2012:33) describes this phenomenon as 
a way of Muslims to find out what is the most 
effective way of da’wah. Moreover, it is also 
important to note that the form of da’wah bil 
qalam is different in each era: in the New 
Order, da’wah or jihad through writings tended 
to be more secretive; in the early era of 
reformasi, da’wah or jihad though writing was 
more open in criticising; and in the Indonesian 
contemporary era, da’wah or jihad is extremely 
open due to the presence of the internet and 
social media.  
Now, I will discuss the contemporary 
issue on political Islam that has been related to 
da’wah in Indonesia since 2014, 14 years after 
the reformasi, when the country divided into 
political binary between those who pro-Jokowi 
and those who pro-Prabowo. In recent years, 
since the political situation heat up between 
the opposition and the incumbent, 
demonstration movements are increasingly 
prevalent in Indonesia. In post-2014, when the 
Indonesian elections were only attended by two 
candidates, namely Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and 
Prabowo Subianto, people was divided into 
two: those who were pro-Jokowi (Projo) and 
the other is pro-Prabowo. These dichotomy are 
often involved in debates on the social media 
even in the trivial matters, for example Jokowi 
breeds a frog or Prabowo rides a horse. 
Everything cannot be separated from the 
conversation of their respective supporters. 
This dichotomy created two sentimental labels, 
cebong for those who are pro-Jokowi (as a 
mocking because Jokowi have frogs as pet) and 
kampret for those who are pro-Prabowo 
(literally means “bat”, but it is also a mock in 
the daily life of Indonesian people) 
It is important to understand the 
background issue of what happen nowadays in 
contemporary Indonesia concerning the 
relationship among Islam, politics and the state, 
especially in Post-Suharto Era, when the politic 
of identity is echoed more loudly in the 
atmosphere and Indonesia is considered “less 
tolerance”. It is interesting to note that while 
Prabowo is supported by many Islamic parties 
and members of Islamic organisations who are 
mostly affiliated with the puritans such as the 
salafi-wahabi or Ikhwanul Muslimin (Islamic 
Brotherhood), most of the Jokowi “Muslim 
supporters (voters)” are coming from the 
Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the biggest and one of 
the oldest traditionalist Islamic organisation in 
Indonesia, initiated by the grandfather of the 
third president, KH. Abdurrahman Wahid. In 
brief, the binary of Indonesia presidential 
election in 2014 has contributed to the 
emergence of public opinions that Prabowo is 
“more Islamic” and more “pro-Islam” than 
Jokowi (Harsono 2019). 
As the incumbent, Jokowi has become 
the object of critics by the opposition. Lots of 
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Prabowo’s supporters affiliated with Islamic 
organisations took the role as the opposition 
and frequently hold protests as their expression 
of insecurities about “de-Islamisation”4 and 
secularisation of Indonesia towards the 
government policies (the most notable was the 
Aksi Bela Islam [Defend Islam] and the 
#2019GantiPresiden [2019 Change the 
President]), either by massive scale 
demonstrations or through writings (via social 
media, publishing books, and writing in 
newspapers). Nevertheless, some people 
believe that secularisation is necessary, 
preventing religion to include in the political 
domain since it is grounded in passional 
attachments and faith, incompatible with 
rational argument (Hirchkind 2009:136).  
One of the important cases related to this 
binary and the concept of jihad that can be 
used as an illustration is the Ahok saga. In 2016, 
Ahok—Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (the former 
governor of Jakarta after Jokowi, a non-Muslim 
Indonesian with Chinese ancestry)—was 
convicted with blasphemy law of insulting Islam 
and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. 
While campaigning for his re-election, he told 
his audience (in Kepulauan Seribu, a district in 
Jakarta) that they should not be misled (ditipu) 
by individuals (in this context, politicians or 
governments) who use the verse in the Qur’an 
(Q.S 5:51) which states that Muslims should not 
allow themselves to be led by or be the allies of 
Christians and Jews (people of the Book). The 
debatable word in this verse is “auliya” which in 
this context is open to several interpretations 
such as leader or best friend (Watson 2018:15). 
Ahok, in many occasions, clarified his words 
that he was just afraid that some individuals will 
use the verse for explicitly forbid Muslims to 
                                                          
4
 In some mainstream media, some Islamic figures stated 
the ‘de-islamisation’ term openly, see, for instance, 
https://kumparan.com/felix-siauw/de-islamisasi-
indonesia, accessed on September 23
rd
, 2019. 
vote for Ahok as governor since he was a 
Christian.5  
Interestingly, after Ahok’s case got viral, 
Muslim groups had different responses to that 
case: pros and cons. Traditionalist Muslims, 
such as those who come from Nahdlatul Ulama 
appeared to be the first who defend pro-Ahok, 
while the reformist (some scholars categorised 
them as fundamentalist), such as those who 
were considered as salafi-wahabi, or PKS were 
mad with the situation. The former Islamic 
group supported Ahok morally as a victim of the 
intolerance in an Islamic-majority country since 
Ahok’s case was considered as the violation of 
Pancasila. The latter Islamic groups, however, 
started to collect mass and had a plan to 
organise the biggest demonstration that Jakarta 
has ever had for demanding Ahok’s trial and 
imprisonment (Watson 2018:15). A series of 
demonstrations were inevitable, known as Aksi 
Bela Islam (Defend Islam Action) started from 
Aksi Bela Islam I (October 14th, 2016) to Aksi 
Bela Islam VII (May 5th, 2017). However, the 
most noticeable one was the Aksi Bela Islam III 
(December 12th, 2016) and popularly known as 
“212” movement. Watson notes that the series 
of demonstrations were “the ad hoc coalition of 
Muslim groups splintered once more into its 
various factions” (Watson 2018:15). This 
confirms Bowen’s argument in the first place 
that as a world religion, the understanding of 
Islam might be varied from one Islamic 
community to another (Bowen 2012:9). Islam 
embedded in the way of living and in the way of 
thinking of the particular Islamic community. 
Those who get involved in the series of 
Aksi Bela Islam considered the demonstrations 
on the street (rally march) as a part of da’wah 
and jihad. In this context, the concepts of 
da’wah and jihad are intertwined because it 
brought Islamic values and it had a tendency to 
                                                          
5
 For the summary of the events (212 And 212 Reunion 
Movement), see 
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2018/12/02/anti-
ahok-protesters-opposition-camp-mark-212-rally-
anniversary.html, accessed on September 25
th
, 2019. 
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call people to do the kindness or goodness 
(amar ma’ruf) as well as avoiding or fighting the 
evil (nahi munkar). For them, what Ahok did 
was bad, a serious blasphemy to the sacred text 
of the Qur’an, so that the government should 
take an action immediately to “punish” Ahok. 
Such kind of action, for the Muslims, is a form 
of goodness since it is considered a way of 
protecting Muslims and defending the religion 
through which the name of the demonstrations 
derived from. The reason why the 
demonstrations were held in a series of action 
is because the government (specifically pointed 
President Jokowi) did not have any interest on 
the movements, he even did not appear to 
meet the mass (Watson 2018:15). From the 
Muslims point of view, who actively engaged as 
the participants of the “212” movement, the 
president tended to “protect” Ahok, prejudiced 
that Jokowi are not pro-Islam. Here where the 
campaign of “anti-Jokowi” through social 
media, websites, magazines, newspapers, and 
books initiated by the alumni of the “212” 
movement as a form of jihad, and therefore 
da’wah bil qalam has begun. There are two 
forms of dakwah bil qalam, one is texts in the 
literatures which include creative writings, 
articles, articles in edited books, magazines, 
newspapers, online (through website) and posts 
in social media, including statuses and memes.  
First, since some members of Islamic 
organisations affiliated to the “212” movement, 
trust to the president Jokowi is absent, more 
and more critics are published. Islamic 
websites, for instance, always published 
provocatively the downside of Jokowi’s regime, 
such as the import policy6 and increasing 
Indonesian debt from Chinese government7, 
                                                          
6
See for instance https://www.portal-
islam.id/2019/09/akhir-yang-menyesatkan.html (The Bad 
Ending)(accessed date, September 25
th
 2019) 
7
See 
https://www.republika.co.id/berita/ekonomi/makro/17/0
7/31/otyh1a377-utang-ri-ke-cina-melonjak-di-era-jokowi-
ini-kata-pemerintah (The Significant Increase of Debt to 
China in Jokowi Era: What Government Said?) (accessed 
date September 25
th
 2019).  
which are considered not pro-Islam since those 
policies tormented people in general 
(tormenting is an evil deed), and the ummah in 
particular. Thus, because of protecting the 
ummah is the priority (protecting is a good 
deed), spreading the writings became the 
obligation of the Islamic writers as a form of 
their jihad.  
Moreover, critics also come from creative 
writings. Books such as 212: Cinta 
Menggerakkan Segala (212: Love Moves 
Everything) written by Rosa and Arnas (2018) is 
a novel with the “212” movement as the 
background in spite the fact that both of them 
are members of Forum Lingkar Pena (Rosa is 
one of the founders of this Islamic writers 
community in 1997). It is a novel which 
criticising the government policy. At some 
points, Islamic writers have not moved on from 
their traditional way of da’wah bil qalam, like 
what they did in the New Order, where every 
kind of critic was covered in a beautiful-Islamic 
way.  
Second, the da’wah bil qalam in social 
media (such as Instagram, Facebook, Twitter, 
and Whatsapp) are extremely different from 
da’wah bil qalam mentioned previously. 
Da’wah bil qalam in this form are more massive 
and difficult to control since it is a new form of 
media-scape and Muslims in particular (Nisa 
2018:27). One of the interesting cases was the 
hashtag #2019GantiPresiden (2019 change the 
president) initiated by the alumni of “212” 
movement. Some reports revealed that the 
movement was successful in a form of 
resistance not only because this hashtag 
became the trending topic in social media, such 
as Twitter and Instagram, but also because 
Jokowi responded the movement as his way of 
treason and dethroning. The case of 
#2019GantiPresiden and the street protests 
that attract Jokowi’s attention is similar to 
Castells’ argument that internet has a powerful 
capacity to mobilise movements and 
revolutions (Castell 2012:229). 
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Some of anonymous Islamic accounts and 
those who oppose Jokowi, such as 
@mahadewi161 (Instagram account) and 
Muslim Cyber Army (Facebook account) 
becomes buzzers to criticise all of Jokowi’s 
policies and attack Jokowi’s supporters in 
extremely impolite manners: mocking, cursing 
and posting nasty words. Based on this 
phenomenon, I argue that the form of jihad or 
da’wah bil qalam in this context is not only far 
out from its normative concept, but also from 
“Islamic way” of resistance that the movement 
tried to build (Rijal 2005; Arnez 2009) since 
mocking or writing nasty words are considered 
as evil deeds, despite Jokowi supporters also 
did the same. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendation 
Taking everything into consideration, it is now 
clear that for the Islamic writers, media such as 
magazines, newspapers, social media, are their 
arena of jihad as a way of amar ma’ruf nahi 
munkar for the sake of the God (fillah) and the 
“pen” as a symbol of writing is their weapon 
instead of guns. It can be described that this 
phenomenon becomes the way of Muslims to 
find out what is the most effective way of 
da’wah. Moreover, the form of da’wah bil 
qalam is different in each era since each period 
shapes different way of da’wah bil qalam. 
While da’wah or jihad through writings in the 
New Order tended to be more “secretive” due 
to the oppression by the government, da’wah 
or jihad through writing in the contemporary 
era not only becomes more open, but also 
becomes more “creative” due to the presence 
of the internet and social media. Nevertheless, 
the point is still the same: it can be considered 
as a form of resistance to the government. 
Therefore, the term “beautiful way” of writing 
is similar to a term that is known as the “Islamic 
way”. It is a concept to explain the form of 
creative writings penetrated by Islamic values 
such as using very polite words, avoiding 
mentioning the incumbent governments, and 
preferring to use metaphorical words. Up to 
this point, it is clear that in Indonesian society, 
religion is still functional not only for the sacred 
rites to fulfill human needs in terms of 
spirituality, but also for political purposes, 
proven by the presence of Islam in every 
situation of political matters in every period of 
Indonesian history after independence. 
Further research in social sciences, 
especially in anthropology is needed to explore 
more about the notion of da’wah bil qalam 
since research related to this topic is quite rare 
to find. In Indonesia, research discussing this 
topic is sometimes considered belong to those 
who are in religious department in Islamic 
university. However, in the field of 
Anthropology and in the scope of very diverse 
country, such as Indonesia, religion becomes a 
very sexy topic to study, especially if it is related 
to political issues. Thus, anthropological 
research approach to Islam could help scholars 
to understand more about how people perceive 
their faith as well as help governments to 
minimise conflict related to religious issues, 
such as radicalism or intolerance.  
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